

# The Relationship between Self-evident and A Priori Knowledge

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**ABSTRACT:** “Self Evident” and “a priori” knowledge are two controversial epistemological concepts which philosophers have widely discussed. The paper will attempt to clarify and articulate the situation and aspects of these two human sources of knowledge and then deal with a very key question about the relationship between them.

**KEYWORDS:** self-evident Knowledge, theoretical, a priori, a posteriori, analytic, synthetic, necessary, contingent.

Before discussing the notions of “self-evident” and “a priori”, we must first clarify what is meant by either, then point out various types of “self-evident” and “a priori”, and finally come to a conclusion about the relationship between them.

## ***Self-evident***

“Self-evident” in logic, philosophy, and epistemology is defined as the knowledge which occurs to our minds naturally and spontaneously; that is, such knowledge does not require thinking and reflection to be obtained. “Thinking” includes purposeful movements and quest of the mind of the unknown to be found out of the known. As Mutahhari says, “the most sublime yet the most astonishing activity of mind is what is referred to in terminology of logic as ‘thinking.’” Thinking takes place when mind uses the known facts and information which has already gained as means of discovering the unknown, that is to say the mind analyzes, compiles, and combines

the known facts and information so as to make the unknown fact known. The known facts and information that already exist in mind act as working assets; mind processes them, takes advantage of them, and extends them”.<sup>1</sup> So, it is clear that self-evident knowledge is the knowledge that does not require thinking and reflection, unlike theoretical knowledge that cannot be achieved without thinking and consideration.

### ***The Nature and Essence of the Self-evident***

As mentioned before, “self-evident” is the knowledge that does not involve thinking and reflection, and is achieved free of thinking and reflection. According to Avicenna, “and these two [concept and judgement] are of two types: one can be perceived through thinking ... and the other is what we perceive and confirm, not through thinking, and not through the quest of wisdom, but by the initial wisdom”.<sup>2</sup> Khawajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi also says: “when any given piece of knowledge or wisdom undergoes validation, it is either independent of judgement for negation or affirmation, which is called concept, or dependent on judgement for negation or affirmation, which is called judgement. Example of concept: rational being. Example of judgement: ‘this being is rational’, or ‘this being is not rational’. Concept and judgement are achieved either through acquired media, or independent of acquired media.”<sup>3</sup> Therefore, self-evident knowledge, either conceptually self-evident or assertively self-evident, does not require thinking and reflection. In non-theorematic conceptual self-evident knowledge we do not need “definition”, because the meaning of thinking in solitary (non-theorematic) concepts is real definition, including approximate and official definitions. The meaning of thinking in theorems and theoretical judgements is reasoning and argumentation. We have limited the definition to “real”, because the self-evident concept is independent of “real definition”; this is not in contradiction with the fact that sometimes, self-evident concept requires literal definition, which is to clarify what is meant by words.

### ***Types of Self-evident Knowledge***

As we know, acquired knowledge is basically divided into concept and judgement, which in turn are divided into self-evident and theoretical. Therefore it could be

assumed that there are two kinds of concept – self-evident and theoretical – and two kinds of theorems and judgements: self-evident and theoretical.

As for examples of self-evident concepts, we may say that self-evident concepts are either sensory (like those of warmth, cold, etc), or rational (like those of existence, unity, necessity, possibility, impossibility, etc), or absolute that can be achieved through direct knowledge (like concepts of fear, sorrow, happiness, etc). As Khawajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi says: “meanings conceived in minds and thoughts are either evident which are independent of acquisition per se, or they are not. The first group is either absolutely rational, like existence, necessity, possibility and impossibility, or directly perceptible to the corporal senses, like warmth, coldness, blackness, whiteness, illumination and darkness, or perceptible to esoteric senses and of which the soul is conscious, like happiness, sorrow, fear, satiation, hunger.”<sup>4</sup> Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi divides the basics of reasoning, which are related to self-evident judgement, into seven categories. In view of the importance of his assertions about the role of intellect in justification of theorems, or even sensible objects and empirical premises, we quote him in detail:

Demonstration: is a deduction composed of certain premises in order to come to a certain conclusion; and to be certain means to certify a judgement as true in a manner that cannot be negated. If these certain premises are acquirable, they inevitably lead to non-acquirable basics, bound to acceptance, of which there are seven:

1. Primal terms: are theorems the judgement of which merely requires conception of the two parts as “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts; and coincidence of opposites is impossible”.
2. Sensible objects: they are theorems that the mind confirms through corporal senses such as: “the sun shines” and “the fire is hot”. What is experienced by senses and not confirmed by the mind cannot be considered to be a sensible object; for example, the sense experiences the sun quantitatively, but the mind cannot confirm it as it is.

3. Intuitional propositions: they are theorems that are consciously perceived, either independently or through inner senses; examples are: our knowledge of our existence and of what we think and enjoy.
4. Empirical premises: they are theorems confirmed by reason as they are frequently repeated, which brings about that type of confirmation of them which cannot be breached by any occult deductive association; if they were random, they would not happen frequently. In many cases the confirmation is bound by certain conditions, such as our belief in scammony's having purgative properties being contingent on it being widely available in our country, as we are sure about the fact of its being laxative at all, and of its being so in all countries; that is why they cannot say that it does not cause diarrhoea in Catania. This is an induction that comes up with a universal ruling based on what can be found in its parts. The induction sometimes conveys certainty to the mind about its being accepted and prepares the mind to reach certainty, such as confirming that when someone is beheaded, he will die. This takes place in uniform cases, while it does not lead to certainty in diverse cases. For example, when we say "animals move their inferior maxilla while eating", there are many instances that do not reach the same induction, or even refute it, like the crocodile in this example. Narrations reported so widely that they are indubitable: they are theorems that are ascertained as the sensible objects are frequently narrated and confirmed by several people. The sensible object in question is possible in nature, and those who confirm it are presumed not to be wont to lie; this is another method of deduction. Sometimes, certainty can only be achieved through a certain number or extent, and no more than that, as is the case with our knowledge of the existence of Mecca in our time or that of Galen in earlier times. Constitutional deductions: they are theorems that are attested because of the existence of a medium which cannot be removed from mind, so we do not need to seek them. For instance our knowledge of the fact that "2 is half of 4" – can be used to immediately conclude two other propositions: '4 is divisible by 2', and '2 is half of 4'. Intuitive propositions are theorems attested by the mind based on pieces of evidence

other than those mentioned above; such pieces of evidence lay the grounds for obtaining certainty.”<sup>5</sup>

In the above extract, Qutb al-Din described the basics of reasoning in detail, introduced moral traits as an independent type, and stressed the role of intellect in judging and generalising all theorems, whether sensory and non-sensory. He also differentiates between “experience” and “induction”, because sensual empirical premises are connected to occult deduction, while induction is not so. This is the point that some Western philosophers and logicians have often ignored.<sup>6</sup> This would help us understand that if Muslim philosophers and logicians consider sensible objects and empirical premises to be certain, it would be due to the judgement of intellect rather than to sensuous perceptions because senses and sensuous perceptions may be subject to mistakes and cannot thus be completely reliable. It is only the intellect that contains valid self-evident perceptions which are not prone to error, and can thus provide a refuge for the senses. Thus, what Muslim philosophers believe in concerning sensible objects and empirical premises is completely different from Western empiricism and sensationalism. Some contemporary Muslim philosophers divide the self-evident basics of reasoning into two kinds, saying:

the fact is that these theorems are not all self-evident. There are only two types of theorems which can be considered to be truly self-evident. One is primary self-evident theorems, and the other is moral traits which are intellectual reflections of direct knowledge. Constitutional deductions and intuitive perceptions are only quasi self-evident theorems, while all other theorems must be considered as theoretical theorems that require reasoning.<sup>7</sup>

### ***A Priori***

Following Kant, Philosophers and epistemologists have employed three types of distinctions: One is the epistemological distinction between “a priori” and “a posteriori”; the second is the metaphysical distinction between “necessary” and “contingent”; and the third is the semantic distinction between “analytic” and “synthetic”.<sup>8</sup> Epistemologists after Kant have used this term widely, but we cannot say that they have used it to convey the same notion.

What the term “a priori” immediately brings to mind is that there are conceptions or theorems which are not originated due to sensuous or esoteric perception. This idea has been attributed to genetical rationalists as they believe that some of our conceptions and beliefs are innate. That is to say, our mind is formed to achieve these conceptions and beliefs regardless of what our senses and reflections provide it with. According to them, senses have no effects at least on some of our conceptions and beliefs, and merely activate some of the conceptions that potentially exist in the human mind. This idea has been attributed to Plato, Descartes, and Leibnitz, standing against empiricists like Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Those who believe in genetical empiricism state that there is nothing in the mind which did not originate in the senses.<sup>9</sup>

Today, the term “a priori” in epistemology is discussed rather in justification of knowledge than in generation of knowledge. Here, the question is no longer whether experience or intellect introduces us to the truth; rather, it is if, with regard to knowledge, we are allowed to accept a theorem that is by no means based on experience. Theorems that we can accept without reference to experience are called basic or a priori (prior to experience) theorems.<sup>10</sup> Kant, too, considered the term “a priori” to mean prior based on the following justification:

That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it.

But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely

the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first sight, whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called *a priori*, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources *a posteriori*, that is, in experience.<sup>11</sup>

The important point is that Kant includes both internal and external senses in his considerations.<sup>12</sup> Others have interpreted his idea in the same way.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, “*a priori*” in his works refers to knowledge which is independent of all sensuous perceptions, whether internal or external.

Here, we must point out that some philosophers consider “*a priori*” to be knowledge which can be justified independent of external and internal sensuous perceptions. This idea could be attributed to Kant as well as some others. On the other hand, there are those who consider “*a priori*” knowledge to be independent of sensory experience. On that basis, some examples of *a priori* knowledge could be mathematical facts, logical facts, and even knowledge of one’s own existence.<sup>14</sup>

Elsewhere, Kant states that *a priori* knowledge is also essential. That is to say that no change is possible in *a priori* knowledge. He also says:

it is true that experience teaches us that something is originated this way or that, but this does not mean that the thing cannot be originated in another way. So, if there is any theorem that is devised while the need for it rises, it would be a *a priori* judgement.<sup>15</sup>

Kant differentiates between pure *a priori* and impure *a priori*, saying,

*a priori* knowledge can be considered to be pure only when it is not mixed with any experiences. For example, “every change has a reason” is an *a priori* theorem. However, it is impure *a priori*, because change is a concept abstracted only from experience.<sup>16</sup>

Therefore, Kant stresses that “a priori” knowledge must be necessary, unlike a posteriori knowledge which is not so; that is, it can be like this at this moment, but different at another. Others also believe that a priori knowledge must be deemed essential. Traditionally, many philosophers believe that every a priori theorem is essential as well, because if a given theorem is not essential, it must be derived from a sensory experience.<sup>17</sup> Yet, some such as Kripke and Kaplan have opposed this idea saying that a priori does not have to be essential, and a theorem can be a priori, but not essential. To them, if something is, for instance, exclusively *F*, then *F* would be *F*, but would not be essential, although it is a priori. Or, generally speaking, “if *P* is true, then *P* is true” is an a priori theorem, but is not essential. In their opinion, “being a priori” indicates that the theorem does not have an empirical justification, and this is different from “being essential”.<sup>18</sup> Kripke decided to work out examples of theorems that were a priori and yet contingent in order to refute the general claim that all a priori knowledge is necessary. In 1980 he claimed that some theorems are a priori and yet contingent. He referred to a system of measurement as an example that may be modified over the course of time, but is valid at the time in question; so it is a priori and contingent, but not necessary.<sup>19</sup> Opponents of this theory may also bring up examples which are a posteriori and yet necessary to refute the claim of concomitance between “a priori” and “necessary”.<sup>20</sup>

Here we are not going to judge these refutations, but we must draw a distinction between the two theorems: “one metre is one metre” and “the length of rod *S* is one metre”. Undoubtedly, the first theorem is an analytic and necessary theorem and cannot be the subject of Kripke’s discussion. But the second theorem, in his point of view, is contingent and a priori, because the length of *S* is not always the same – it can change due to heat, expansion, or other conditions. Obviously, to solve this problem, we must clarify the subject of the second theorem: whether it is “the absolute length of *S*” or “the length of *S* at this time”? This would help us recognize whether this theorem is necessary or contingent, and whether our knowledge of it is a priori or a posteriori. If the subject is “the length of *S* at this time”, the theorem “the length of *S* is one metre” would be a necessary a priori theorem. However, if the subject is not limited to the present time, the theorem would be a contingent a posteriori theorem. Therefore, Kripke’s claim about contingent a priori theorems cannot always be true.<sup>21</sup>



Therefore, it was made clear that classical approaches believed in concomitance between a priori and necessary, but the idea was gradually challenged as such necessities threatened the basics of empiricism. Ayer says:

what brings about problems for the empiricists relates to formative logic and mathematical facts, as despite the general belief that scientific generalisations are fallible, all believe that logical and mathematical facts are necessary and certain. However, if empiricism is believed to be correct, no theorem of real subject can be necessary or certain.<sup>22</sup>

Obviously, Ayer interprets “being necessary” as “being certain and infallible”, which refers to trueness and not to the direction, while what Kant meant was rather the necessity of the direction of theorem. Therefore, the concept of “necessary” in this discussion has been linked to Leibnitz’s ideas about all possible worlds, saying: “a necessarily true theorem is a theorem that cannot be false, or according to Leibnitz, is true in all possible worlds. However, a contingent theorem is a theorem that can be false.”<sup>23</sup> The point is that “being necessarily true” does not mean that a theorem that is true at this time cannot be false at any other time. Of course if a theorem is fallible, it cannot be true in all possible worlds, but the infallibility and necessity of a theorem does not mean that the subject of that theorem is necessary.

Ayer criticizes John Stuart Mill’s viewpoint where he states that logical and mathematical theorems are not necessary.<sup>24</sup> He then tries to free himself of such necessities and thus claims that since logical and mathematical facts are analytic, they cannot have real subjects; that is to say, they give us no information about empirical states and do not extend our knowledge, nor do they tell us something we did not know.<sup>25</sup> Here, even if we accept that, according to Ayer, analytic theorems do not extend our knowledge – which is not true, because specific knowledge is different from general knowledge – we must ask Ayer how this type of theorem is true. Can it be justified through experiment?

Some believe that a priori theorems are limited to analytic theorems. Swinburne says: “a theorem is a priori if, and only if, it is analytic.” So, according to him all a priori theorems are analytic.<sup>26</sup> However, as we know, this approach opposes that of Kant who believed in synthetic a priori theorems.<sup>27</sup>

So, although most philosophers believe that a priori knowledge is also necessary, there are those who oppose this idea. Today, even a minimal approach has been brought forth concerning a priori knowledge, in which there is no association between “being a priori” and “necessity”, or between “being innate” and “being self-evident”.<sup>28</sup>

### ***The Nature of a Priori***

Based on the above detailed discussion, we have concluded that the term “a priori”, which came into existence in philosophical and epistemological discourses in the 17<sup>th</sup> century has undergone several interpretations. It sometimes refers to the time and can be interpreted as “genetical a priori”. This term has another interpretation, based on which it is referred to in modern epistemology. Ayer says:

the subject of our discussion – when we say that logical and mathematical facts are independent of experience [a priori] – is not the history of their discovery, or psychology of the way humans learn these facts. It is rather an epistemological issue.<sup>29</sup>

Hospers believes that when we say a certain item of knowledge is a priori, we do not mean that it is prior to all experiences in terms of time. Here, we discuss neither the time of cognition nor the way that leads us to it. We rather discuss the way that attests the knowledge.<sup>30</sup>

Therefore, considering this issue, another interpretation for “a priori” was devised that can be called “epistemological interpretation”. Generally speaking, we can say that epistemological interpretation of “a priori” is related to its being “independent of experience”. Yet different philosophers have different interpretations of “experience”. Some believe that “experience” includes all external and internal experiences.<sup>31</sup> Some say that an a priori theorem is a theorem that can be proven true without referring to any personal experiences.<sup>32</sup> But experience in this context is sometimes interpreted as experiencing something beyond human bodies, physical states, and human thoughts and wishes. Based on this interpretation of “experience”, phrases like “I am in pain” or “I am thinking about which city to go” would be “a priori”, but then according to the interpretation of “experience”, none of these could be a priori.<sup>33</sup> However, it is clear that the general interpretation of

“experiment” is not so general as to include even the type of general experience discussed in a priori knowledge – like the rational intuition in which Descartes believed.<sup>34</sup>

This way we come to two epistemological interpretations of a priori. One is knowledge which is independent of all sorts of experience, and the other is the knowledge that does not require sensory experiences. Further, considering necessity as a sign or criterion of “being a priori”,<sup>35</sup> we would come to two other epistemological interpretations of “a priori”. One is a priori knowledge which is strengthened by necessity, and the other is a priori knowledge which is not strengthened by necessity, that is a necessary a priori the subject of which is not necessary.


### ***Types of a Priori***

Based on what was discussed, and based on the fact that “a priori” can be conceptual, theoretical, or judgemental, we can divide a priori into the following categories: “conceptual” and “judgemental”, which can in turn be divided into “genetical” and “epistemological”.

On the other hand, there are debates on the justification of “epistemological a priori” and the type of experience it should be independent of (whether absolute experience (internal and external) or sensory experience). So, epistemological and judgemental a priori can be divided both into “epistemological a priori independent of absolute experience (external and internal)” and “epistemological a priori independent of sensory experience”. It is to be mentioned that here we consider justification as equivalent to epistemological evaluation that includes both concepts and judgements.

We can also divide “only judgemental a priori” – genetical and epistemological – into “modal necessary” and “non modal necessary”, because non-theorem concepts cannot undergo such divisions as necessity and persistence, and factors like that can only be related to theorems and judgements and not to concepts.

The following graph demonstrates the types of a priori mentioned earlier:



**Relationship**

We have now reached the final discussion about the relationship between “self-evident” and “a priori”. It is necessary to mention that in this discussion we do not refer to the minimal approach to a priori because there is no association between a priori and self evident in this approach. We also do not solely consider the interpretation of self-evident that says: “self-evident is a belief the justification of which is not based on anything other than itself”<sup>36</sup> because this approach is not so clear in the classical definition of self-evident. In this evaluation we take the classical meaning of a priori, which is also acceptable to Muslim philosophers. This meaning, as mentioned above, refers to knowledge which does not require any thought. Examples of this are definition in concepts, and reasoning in theorems and judgements.

We start our evaluation with genetical a priori (conceptual and judgemental). Since genetical a priori – the knowledge generated independent of sensory experience and absolute experience (inward and outward) – can be either self-evident or theoretic, so, the relationship between them is that of set to subset. Of

course this relationship takes place when we accept that such a thing can be genetically realized as many say that the senses are the source of generating perceptions. Aristotle says: “he who has no senses, has no knowledge”. In other words, someone missing one of his senses cannot have knowledge related to that sense. For example, someone who cannot see cannot have no knowledge of colour. ‘Allamah Tabataba’i interprets Aristotle’s words as follows:

senses are the sources from which knowledge reaches us, and from this we can understand that what the First Teacher means by ‘he who has no senses has no knowledge’ is the type of knowledge linked to the respective sense.<sup>37</sup>

Of course what Aristotle states in his *Book of Reasoning* approves this interpretation as he says:

it is clear that when a certain sense is missing, a piece of knowledge would be necessarily missing.”<sup>38</sup> Khawajah Nasir al-Din Tusi has this to say on the matter: “it must be clarified that the source of all general and applied sciences is sense. From the beginning of disposition to the time of gaining self-evident and theoretic knowledge human psyche can perceive primary intelligible and acquired knowledge through senses. For this reason Aristotle has said that he who has no senses, has no knowledge.”<sup>39</sup>

It must be clarified that what Khawajah Nasir says in the interpretation of Aristotle’s idea is related to the role of senses in the origination of knowledge, and not to evaluation and justification of knowledge. For this reason he continues to say:

so we see that no knowledge can be originated without the help of senses, and we can understand the meaning of Aristotle’s words. Yet, we must realise that in the realm of rational conceptions, senses can only help us come to knowledge, and the intellect controls every judgement, and thus senses cannot originate any knowledge independently.<sup>40</sup>

However, the relationship between “conceptual epistemological a priori” and “conceptual self-evident” is that of an intersection with regard to subject, regardless

of whether we consider a priori to be independent of absolute (internal and external) experience in terms of judgement, or to be independent of sensory experience in terms of evaluation. However, something that does not require experience is not necessarily self-evident; it can be theoretical as well, because, as mentioned above, self-evident conceptions can be of three types: sensory concepts like the concept of colour, moral concepts like the concept of sorrow, and rational concepts like the concept of existence. So, conceptual a priori or self-evident concepts can come true in some cases. Their coincidence takes place in self-evident rational concepts. But if “independent of experience” means “independent of apparent senses”, the coincidence can take place in moral concepts as well. Therefore, whatever we mean by experience, the relationship between “conceptual epistemological a priori” and “self-evident conception” is intersection with regard to subject. The criterion for “a priori” is in non-sensory concepts that are theoretic, like concepts of essence, matter, form, originality, etc. Moreover, the criterion for “self-evident” is in sensory and moral concepts that are all self-evident as mentioned above.

The relationship between “judgemental epistemological a priori” and “judgemental self-evident” is also intersection with regard to subject. It does not matter whether we consider a priori to be independent of absolute (internal and external) experience, consider it to be independent of sensory experience or choose to accept the approaches of earlier philosophers who divided self-evident judgements of reasoning into seven categories as primal terms, sensible objects, moral traits, empirical premises, constitutional deductions, intuitive propositions, and successive narrations,<sup>41</sup> or, as contemporary philosophers do, whittle them down to primal terms and moral traits.<sup>42</sup> It would make no difference, because a priori judgement which is independent of internal and external experiences, or, of sensory experiences only, is not necessarily self-evident because a judgement which does not require experience can be theoretical as well, as can many logical, mathematical, and philosophical theorems. On the other hand, there might be self-evident judgements that require experience, like sensory theorems or moral traits considered to be self-evident by earlier philosophers. These two converge in self-evident judgements that do not require senses, like primal terms. The theorem “coincidence of opposites is not possible” is independent of sense, while it is a priori and at the same time self-

evident. It is clear that if we consider “a priori” to be independent of sensory experiences, their coincidence can take place in morals as well.

But what is the relationship between “a priori epistemological genetical judgements” that are based on necessity and “self-evident judgements”? Apparently, the relationship between these two is also intersection with regard to subject, because a priori judgements that do not require absolute (internal and external) experience or only sensory experiences can be either self-evident or theoretical. On the other hand, according to both classical and modern philosophers, self-evident attestations do not have to be modal necessary. For example, the self-evident theorem “I’m happy now” is not a necessary theorem that can be true about all possible worlds. Happiness is not logically essential for the existence of the subject that is “I”. “I” can exist without being “happy”. Unlike some self-evident theorems that are necessary, like the theorem “a whole is greater than sum of its parts”, as well as basic theorems and analytic theorems that are sometimes examples of the basics. These theorems can be true about “necessity-based a priori judgement” and “self-evident judgement”. Therefore, the relationship between these two is intersection with regard to subject, and their coincidence takes place in the primal terms.

However, if we do not consider self-evident judgement to be based on necessity, this relationship would be something like what we mentioned in the comparison between a priori attestations and self-evident judgements. As mentioned above, some have correlated a priori theorems to analytic theorems defining them in a manner that include only analytic theorems.<sup>43</sup> Now, if we want to consider the relationship between a priori (in this sense) and self-evident theorems, we would say that their relationship is that of set to subset. According to this point of view, there is only one instance of judgemental a priori which is analytic, whereas there are more instances of self-evident judgements. We must conclude by pointing out some important questions:

1. What is a priori knowledge?
2. Does a priori knowledge exist?
3. What is the relationship between “a priori” and “analytic”?
4. What is the relationship between “a priori” and “necessary”?

5. What is the relationship between “a priori” and “self-evident”?

Only the first four questions were answered in the book *Justification of a priori*<sup>44</sup> but in this article we tried to answer all five.

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