

# A Survey of John Hick's Social Pluralism from Imām Khomeinī's Viewpoint

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**ABSTRACT:** Tolerance is a kind of social behaviour generated in its appropriate semantic framework. The social pluralism based on pluralism of religious knowledge and the theological pluralism of salvation is a kind of interpretation of tolerance which benefits from modern philosophical grounds. Adopting the said approach and having passed from historical interpretation of the church, John Hick, as a clergyman, has attempted to present a new interpretation of Christianity. Having elaborated Imām Khomeinī's view as an interpretation in the Islamic thought the present essay also investigates and criticises John Hick's thoughts on the basis of his new theoretical hypothesis.

**KEYWORDS:** tolerance, cognitional pluralism, pluralism of salvation, social pluralism, relativity of understanding, multiplicity of human knowledge.

## *Introduction*

No society can survive without a kind of internal and external order which organises its relations with internal parts and external elements. Internal and external relations are associated with a kind of agreement and adaption. Disagreement and contention are other parts of internal and external elements of any order. Friendship, passion, kindness, unity, and tolerance, with their various extents, are mostly or partly among concepts which lie in the realm of agreement and adaption; and resentment, hatred, animosity,

disagreement, corruption, confrontation, and wars are characteristic of disagreement and conflict. Tolerance is a realm of adaption and agreement – not necessarily accompanied by friendship and kindness – which includes some disagreement and plurality, which to some extent puts an end to fights and disagreements.

Social behaviours are meaningful actions and do not take shape without a cognitive background; that is why every order organises its social agreement, including tolerance, in accordance with a suitable semantic framework.

The western world has shaped its social agreement, including internal and external tolerance, in the Middle Ages and the contemporary era on the basis of two opposing cognitive orders (in the Middle Ages, on the Church's reading of Christianity, and in the contemporary era, on modern, secular, cognitive, and philosophical grounds). Those two cognitive orders are in harmony with and supported by two different political systems.

Despite using its new cognitive grounds, western tolerance currently takes various forms. Such forms can be seen in various historical periods, covering various decades, in forms of multiple social orders which are distinguished by different isms such as socialism, capitalism, nationalism, fascism, liberalism and so on. That variety shows wide range of modern cognitive fields for expounding, the mode of transformation, and social tolerance in such a way that each historical period is influenced by some parts of that field or has actualized some part of it according to its social, political, and cultural elements.

One of the most prevailing interpretations of tolerance which uses modern philosophical grounds and is in accordance with liberal thought and political system, is an interpretation which expounds social tolerance as social pluralism on the basis of cognitive pluralism and religious pluralism. Such an interpretation has several representatives in the political thought of the twentieth century. In this article, however, we choose John Hick as the representative of this thought, for the two following reasons:

Firstly, as a clergyman, Hick is obligated to maintain an interest in and connection with Christianity. Therefore, he has to present the modern interpretation of tolerance he expounds in relation to the church's historical interpretation of the matter and indicate his methodology for a change by adopting a new approach to Christianity.

Secondly, the Iranian society is familiar with his thoughts translated directly or indirectly. That familiarity is partly due to some Iranian intellectuals stemming from historical comparison made by them between Iranian and perhaps other non-western cultures and societies and western ones.

Tolerance also has a background in Islamic culture and history. Those who draw parallels with western culture compare the history of the Islamic world with the Middle Ages of Christianity, without feeling any need to scrutinise what Islām actually says. They assume social agreement and both internal and external tolerance within the Islamic system to be in accordance with those Ages and recommend a modern interpretation and application of tolerance.

The purpose of this article is to present the Islamic world's interpretation of Islamic world with reference to Muslims' cognitive sources and grounds, ignoring imported simulations on the one hand and primary Islamic sources on the other. In this regard, Imām Khomeinī is taken to be representative of Islamic thought for the two following reasons:


Firstly, Imām Khomeinī is a great mystic, philosopher, and jurist who is directly and deeply familiar with Islamic cognitive treasures.

Secondly, as a religious authority and social leader, Imām Khomeinī has marked an important milestone in Islamic civilization; that is why his thoughts are representative of Muslim interpretation of social tolerance quite distinct from the views of those who emulate western culture in their thoughts.

Another introductory point to be noted is that this essay is a summary; the full version is published elsewhere.

### ***Social Pluralism According to John Hick's***

**The model of social pluralism proposed by John Hick is as follows:**



Through cognitive pluralism, he reaches religious pluralism followed by messianic pluralism and through religious pluralism and messianic pluralism arrives at social pluralism.

Cognitive pluralism can be formed on the basis of some epistemological viewpoints which have been presented in modern as well as postmodern epistemological approaches such as:

- A. Positivism, as it denies the cosmological credibility of intellectual knowledge including metaphysical or religious propositions;
  - B. Neo-Kantian cognitive theories;
  - C. Wittgenstein's theory of lingual games;
  - D. Frankfort's cognitive circle;
  - E. Postmodern epistemological viewpoints
- and so on.

Logically speaking, the said epistemologies would firstly result in relativity of

understanding and then universal or wide-ranging relativity of truth in human knowledge. Secondly, they would lead to multiple parallel cognitions arising from the mental circumstances in various historical, social, or political backgrounds.

Most political philosophers have made the said cognitive field as a ground for recommending a particular kind of patience, tolerance, and social pluralism which lies in the realm of liberal-political thought. Among such philosophers are Karl Popper, Friedrich Hayek, Isaiah Berlin, Jürgen Habermas and Lyotard.

There are other liberal philosophers who adopt social pluralism without reference to earlier epistemological texts. The general characteristic of the first group is that they see the existence of multiple parallel cognitions as evidence of the impossibility of giving preponderance to any of them. The result of this is that they are all recognized as equal, creating a need for patience and tolerance. The second group is characterised by their considering patience and tolerance to be the result of ontological and anthropological principles and foundations without treating all kinds of knowledge as equal and parallel as regards cognitive value. The method adapted by John Lock or John Rowels for defending liberalism is of the second kind.

What distinguishes John Hick is that he inserts the cognitive method of the first group into the realm of religious cognition (the second axis) and then into theological problems (the fourth axis), opening thereby two new axes (the third and fifth) for expounding social pluralism. In fact, he has attempted to overcome obstacles to this kind of social pluralism in Christian thought. In other words, as he explicitly asserts, he presents a new interpretation and reading of Christianity, which is not in accordance with its traditional reading, for modern social behaviour.

Using Kant's and Wittgenstein's theories, he separates the truth of religion from religious knowledge, thereby treating different religions as the result of multiple cognitions achieved by human beings under the influence of cultural

and historical circumstances in encountering the ontology of religion. Referring to Kant's epistemology, he writes:

Before everyone else, it was Immanuel Kant who brought the understanding of such things into the stream of modern human thought. From that time, such issues have been confirmed and reinforced by many studies not only in general epistemology, but in psychology based on knowledge and cognition, and in sociology and philosophy of science. The essential truth, which should also be taken into consideration by epistemology of religion, is that the environment around us is not reflected in consciousness in a simple, direct manner, precisely as it is, independent of our manner of conception and imagination.<sup>1</sup>

This consideration and perception of various divine individuations that [according to Kant] creates different divine phenomena, which are experienced by human beings in agreement with that genuine divine essence, enables us to confirm the rate and portion of truth in various kinds of theories with regard to projecting the religion, from the time of Feuerbach, to Freud to the present. However, according to this perspective, it is not projection or human infusing that creates God; rather projection influences the methods and ways through which the independent existence of the Divine Truth is experienced.<sup>2</sup>

Referring to what he has derived from Wittgenstein's lingual games theory, John Hick writes:

There is a kind of relativity of forms of experience which Wittgenstein calls language games, but I prefer to call it different cultures. This helps us understand why there is no single kind or form of religious optional experience with a superstructure of its own specific theological theories, but rather many of what we call different religions.<sup>3</sup>

Based on the aforementioned epistemological foundation, Hick firstly doubts the Christian claim of exclusivity in attaining the truth because based on the

said foundation, different religions are the same at attaining the truth. In other words, they are deprived of a pure perception of the truth, due to the fact that each of them looks at the ultimate truth of religion from the angle of its own cultural concepts. Secondly, he considers the exclusiveness of the path of salvation to the Christian tradition, based on the exclusiveness of the truth to Christianity, to be incorrect because based on the said foundation; Christians cannot consider themselves the only ones capable of attaining the truth and the only people of salvation.

John Hick stipulates multiplicity of religious ontological pluralism and religious messianic pluralism as a kind of preliminary to social pluralism which is accompanied by social patience and tolerance. Through his religious and messianic pluralism, he, in fact, negates the reason Christianity presents for the veraciousness of its behaviour and societal treatment of non-Christians recommending social patience and tolerance. This is because Christians' and other religionists' cognitive and behavioural status are treated as equal with regard to the truth. His recommendation on social tolerance is akin to the recommendation made by the group of political philosophers who make the negation of the cosmological value of ideological propositions a preliminary to liberal political philosophy.

The methodology adopted by John Hick is as follows:

First, he uses relativity of understanding as the basis of his epistemology;

Secondly, he accepts human cognitive pluralism, on the basis of relativity of understanding, even with regard to one single truth;

Thirdly, he arrives at religious cognitive pluralism on the basis of his aforementioned cognitive pluralism;

Fourthly, he doubts the Christian claim of exclusively attaining the truth;

Fifthly, he considers the exclusivity of the path of salvation to Christian tradition to be incorrect;


Sixthly, he refutes the Christians' reason for their severity to non-Christians

because of their belief in the truthfulness of their own creed on the one hand and non-Christians' error on the other and,

Seventhly, he treats the equality of the Christian and non-Christian cognitive status, and their sharing the same problem as regards salvation as the grounds for recommending social pluralism.

### ***Imām Khomeinī's View on Social Tolerance***

The model Imām Khomeinī proposes for social tolerance is as follows:



Based on Islamic philosophy especially that of Mullā Ṣadrā, Imām Khomeinī believes neither in the relativity of truth nor of understanding, nor in raw, naive positivistic realism. In his opinion, cognitive pluralism which is based on relativity of understanding lacks cosmological value and leads, firstly, to scepticism first. Secondly, it does not logically result in the preponderance of social pluralism and tolerance because all thought is of the same value and status in the saline desert of scepticism and doubt, and so there is no reason to invalidate the opinion of those who do not tolerate patience or social pluralism.

Negation of the relativity of truth or understanding causes inequality in the level and position of all conceptual cognitions and leads to their being qualified as true or false. On the other hand, the negation of raw realism leads to an expanded system of concepts as well as primary and secondary categories through its special methodology and logic, which offers human beings a way of distinguishing between true and false.<sup>4</sup>



Although Imām Khomeinī does believe in the cosmological value of conceptual cognitions, does not deny the possibility of attaining the truth or recognising falsehood. As a result, he does not believe all cognitive concepts are of equal value. He considers the circle of concepts to be always limited and restricted in relation to the truth, in the sense that every concept can indicate the truth from its own semantic angle. This enables him to accept the horizontal or vertical multiplicity of human cognitions while denying cognitive pluralism based on the relativity of understanding because limited conceptual cognitions are like different images indicative of the external fact from different angles provided they are attained in a sound methodical way. These images, when placed next to each other whether horizontally or vertically, will reveal dimensions or greater depths of reality the more there are.<sup>5</sup>

Referring to various cognitive sources such as senses, intellect, and intuition and using different levels of theoretical and practical intellect in Islamic philosophy, Imām Khomeinī opens the way to social tolerance and patience escaping from the deadlock reached by pluralism based on relativity of understanding. For, as mentioned earlier, when based on relativity of understanding or truth, cognitive pluralism cannot logically lead to social pluralism; instead, it leads to such monopolistic perspectives as fascism or extremist nationalism.

Based on Imām Khomeinī's epistemology, practical intellect can make judgments necessitating tolerance and patience towards others and treat anything contrary to it as wrong whereas with relativity of understanding, no room is left to treat any thought as wrong – in which case all such thought that rejects patience and promotes violence is logically of the same level as its opposite. In such circumstances, where no room is left for logical judgment, it is left to social convention to judge as the only surviving criterion.

### ***Fundamental and Superstructural Criticism of Religious Cognitive Pluralism***

Imām Khomeinī's philosophical and epistemological principles also affect religious cognition. On the basis of them, religious ontological pluralism, as

proposed by John Hick, is to be criticised both fundamentally and super-structurally.

Fundamental criticism of religious ontological pluralism considers that theory to be indefensible in principle because it is based on relativity of understanding. Imām Khomeinī disagrees on the basis of Mullā Ṣadrā's epistemology.

His structural criticism targets the connection John Hick makes between religious cognitive pluralism and social pluralism, treating such a connection as logically incorrect – like the aforementioned criticism of the connection between cognitive pluralism and social pluralism. This is because there would be no proof for the preponderance of religious cognition, which recommends social tolerance, over religious harshness which leads to violence, leaving no room for social tolerance if religious cognition, like other kinds of human knowledge, is formed within a framework of presuppositions and mental, historical, or cultural patterns and presents no version of religious truth which can truly be qualified by truthfulness or falsehood, resulting, in turn, in the equality of all cognitions. In such a case, power becomes the ultimate criterion.

There are further super-structural problems with religious cognitive pluralism: on the basis of this cognitive foundation, a judgment on the existence of transcendent religious truths would also not escape the grasp of relativity of understanding, inasmuch as it forms part of human knowledge; hence, it is judged to be of the same level as denial of religious transcendent truth without there being any logical criterion to ascertain the truthfulness or falsehood of either. John Hick and others who believe in the relativity of understanding and accordingly of religious cognition are left without any proof when facing such religious propositions, i.e. they cannot accept the existence of God or transcendent truth as an indubitable truth which reveals the truth free of human lingual characteristics or mental structure.

### ***Horizontal and Vertical Multiplicity of Religious Cognition and Social Tolerance***

Parallel to denying religious cognitive pluralism and based on the foundation

of his epistemology, Imām Khomeinī recognises a kind of horizontal and vertical multiplicity of religious cognition appropriate to various levels and stages of revelation and prophets as well as different levels of religious scholars' knowledge. Each stage of this knowledge presents a degree and position of piety in accordance with the kind of need or historical, cultural, and social status and position of religious people. According to this perspective, religious cognition always presents a part of religion in accordance with the position and behaviour of religious people; it is not the case that the angle through which religious people look is like a dark grey glass which gives a certain colour and shape to the reality of religion, adding or removing parts. Accordingly, the religious knowledge and cognition of prophets, saints, and religious scholars, with regard to any situation and any part of religion, is truthful because it presents the reality of religion. However, a religious scholar inevitably errs when he is prevented from attaining the truth.

Contrary to an approach based on relativity of understanding, the aforementioned theory of religious cognition makes way for mutual understanding and agreement between religious people and those with different levels of religious knowledge, as well as social tolerance of those deprived of knowing the religious truth, in the form of true religious proposition. Hence, according to this approach, if the sources of religious cognition (intellect and revelation) recommend certain levels of tolerance for who have made mistakes or behaved wrongly even though they know right from wrong, that recommendation is acceptable as a religious judgment. Any contrary recommendation should be treated as wrong, incorrect, and invalid even if it is presented as a religious recommendation.

The mistake made by John Hick and many liberal theorists is to believe that there can be no foundation for social tolerance if the behaviour of others can epistemologically be judged to be valid or correct, and that there can only be a foundation for social tolerance and pluralism if epistemologically the truthfulness or falsehood of cognitions are evaluated as being of the same

level. Both these suppositions are wrong. Firstly, there is no logical reason to make it impossible to tolerate people who are deprived of attaining the truth; thus, if epistemology is presented in a way which leaves room to assess others' knowledge as correct or incorrect, violence against and opposition to those deprived of knowledge of the truth should not be concluded to be inevitable. Secondly, as mentioned above, relativity of understanding or equality of all human or religious cognitions cannot lead to a recommendation to tolerate others – such a conclusion is not even possible, because there it provides no way to categorise as wrong, the opinions of those who oppose tolerance for others and commend, as correct, tolerance and patience.

### ***The Relationship between Salvation, and Religious Cognition and Social Tolerance Respectively***

The last issue to be compared and investigated in this article is that of salvation and its relationship to religious cognition, and tolerance and patience or social pluralism respectively.

#### **In John Hick's opinion:**

Firstly, as attaining the truth prevents tolerance for those who are deprived of the truth, salvation of some or all religious people or prevents tolerance for those who are deprived of salvation.

Secondly, as cognitive pluralism based on relativity of understanding treats all religious cognitions as equal, it prevents a belief in exclusive salvation; negation of belief in exclusive salvation results in treating all religions as being of the same level – referred to by theologians as pluralism of salvation.

Thirdly, in order to solve what he perceives to be a problem caused by salvation for social pluralism, John Hick relies on theological pluralism of salvation: he believes that theological pluralism of salvation dictates the preponderance of social pluralism.

Regarding the first matter, Imām Khomeinī is the representative of Muslim

philosophy (especially Mullā Ṣadrā's), Islamic mysticism and Shiite theology and jurisprudence.

Firstly, based on Shiite theology, Islamic philosophy and mysticism, he does not believe salvation is dependent upon attaining the truth. Instead, he considers a sizeable number of unbelievers and those deprived of the truth to be innocent, and, in Avicenna's (Ibn Sina's) words, people of Paradise.

Secondly, based on Islamic, especially Shiite, jurisprudence, he does not consider tolerance to be dependent upon the issue of salvation; rather, in many cases, he deems tolerance for those who are not people of salvation to be necessary, considering intolerance to be wrong.

### ***Denial of the Necessity to Attain the Truth and Salvation***

Regarding the innocence of such unbelievers who are deprived of knowing the truth, and, possibility of their salvation, he writes:

The reason why the actions [of many unbelievers] are not considered to be a sin and accordingly will not be punished is that most of them, with a few exceptions, were ignorant of the truth; they are innocently, and not culpably, ignorant.

Innocent ignorance of both learned and lay unbelievers is explained by Imām Khomeinī as follows:

As for their laypersons being innocently ignorant of their divine duties and tasks, it is obviously clear, because, just like Muslim laypersons, they have not thought of other religions and are certain of the truthfulness of their own religion and the invalidity of other religions.

Their laypersons are like Muslim laypersons who are absolutely certain of the truthfulness of their own religion and the invalidity of other religions without having any doubt about this matter, due to their having being born and having grown up an Islamic environment. Someone who is absolutely certain of something is

excused for following his certitude, will not be treated as a sinner, and therefore, will not be punished.

As for the clergy, most of them are absolutely certain of their beliefs in such a way that they reject anything contrary to their beliefs – because of having grown up and trained in an unbelieving environment. Jewish and Christian scholars, precisely like Muslim scholars, consider others' proofs to be incorrect, considering the falsehood of such proofs to be self-evident. The truthfulness of his own religion is self-evident to him and he nothing to contradict that even occurs to him. True, if a scholar thinks it is probable that others are right and then fails to search for the truth, he is culpably ignorant and will not be excused – like Jewish and Christian scholars who lived in the early Islamic era. Unbelievers; therefore, are divided into two groups: innocent and culpable. On the other hand, divine duties, with regard to both beliefs and actions, are shared by all: learned and knowledgeable and ignorant – whether innocent or culpable. Unbelievers will be punished for not believing in the truth and not performing religious duties – provided they are aware of the truth, of course. Thus, as Muslims will be punished if they do not perform Islamic duties, though this does not mean that all Muslims, whether innocent or culpable, will be punished because of that, Reason and principles of justice dictate that unbelievers should be treated in the same way.<sup>6</sup>

According to the Imām's words, punishment of individuals is not based on their awareness, but rather on their intention: only those who are culpably ignorant of fundamental teachings or practical duties will be punished, not those who are innocently ignorant; each will be punished commensurate with the level of his culpability. The Imām's explicit assertion as to unbelievers being accountable for both knowing fundamental teachings and performing practical duties clarifies his foundation for cognitive pluralism and religious cognitive pluralism. The Imām does not believe in the relativity of truth, for

one who believes in that cannot speak of one single truth which should be followed by everybody. His foundation is also not relativity of understanding because on the basis of relativity of understanding there will remain no room to treat some beliefs as veracious and others as invalid.

The Imām does not solve the objection raised by those, such as the followers of the church, who consider salvation to be exclusive to certain people, groups, or believers in certain thoughts through the abortive concept of religious cognitive pluralism. His way is shift the question of punishment or salvation from awareness and knowledge to responsibility and duty. Individuals are evaluated on the basis of their efforts within the limitations of their knowledge; hence, those who have become psychologically certain of their beliefs due to their environment, and are deprived of scholarly certainty are excused from punishment, because of the rational principle of the reprehensibility of punishment without explanation (*qubḥ al-ʿiqāb bilā bayān*): they were unable to attain the truth but not through culpable ignorance. In Imām Khomeinī's approach, they are excused not because of relativity of understanding or of truth; rather, this is because of their limited understanding and even their inability to understand more. Reason dictates that it is absolutely certain that they should be excused in such cases.

It can be concluded from said the above that, unlike John Hick, Imām Khomeinī does not see any need for religious cognition and salvation from punishment; he believes that attaining the truth is not the only path to salvation. Punishment is broader than knowledge; some levels of misery and punishment are restricted to those who have comprehended the truth but rebelled against it, such as Pharaoh and his companions who, as stated in the Qurʾān, acknowledged divine signs but denied them: “and they denied them, though their souls acknowledged them.” (Sūrah 27: 14)

### ***Refutation of the Concomitance between Salvation and Tolerance***

As there is no concomitance between religious cognition and salvation, there is no concomitance between salvation and social tolerance. Since John Hick

looks at this question from a Christian angle, he has neglected the true logical relationship between the aforementioned affairs and thereby believes in the concomitance between salvation and social tolerance; he has no choice but to develop the question of salvation on the basis of cognitive pluralism in order to solve the problem of tolerance.

Let us suppose that he can defend his epistemological foundation, namely the relativity of understanding; however, his ostensibly broader definition of salvation is not, in fact, a broader definition of salvation at all; on the contrary, it creates doubt about there even being any salvation. For, if salvation is based on attaining the truth, religious cognitive pluralism considers all religions to be the same, due to their being influenced by historical, cultural, and social dimensions; even though, they contradict each other. Thus, knowledge of salvation of none of them will be actualised and they will all be the same level in this respect.

According to John Hick, the similar cognitive situation of different religions and similar doubt about salvation through each of them necessitate the preponderance of social pluralism. However, there is no logical connection between doubt about salvation through one or another and the necessity to tolerate others.

The need to tolerate followers of other religions can be found in the behavioural teachings of many religions and sects. If religious cognitive pluralism also doubts the validity and rightness of religious cognitions, not only is social tolerance not logically consequential, but there is no way to arrive at the logical preponderance of tolerance, as explained above. The only way for tolerance to be right and impatience and violence to be wrong is if the relativity of understanding is denied and religious cognition is accepted. Of course, absolute unconditional tolerance and forbearance do not necessarily follow on from this; rather, it paves the way for researchers on religious argumentation and investigation and provides the opportunity to judge historical events and acts committed in the name of religion.



Doubtless throughout history so many wars broke out in the name of religion, just as the bloodiest wars in history, namely the first and second world wars, broke out in the name of defending democracy and other secular concepts.

Denying the validity of human cognition or religious cognition and treating all cognitions the same – the result of relativity of understanding – makes it impossible to judge this historical fact. It is only through expounding human as well and religious cognition in a way which safeguards their cognitive validity that judgment is possible. Of course, accepting the possibility of cognition and judgment alone does not inevitably lead to social pluralism, tolerance, and acceptance since some religions, despite recognizing the validity of human or religious cognitions, not only consider others to be misled and unblessed, but also forbid tolerance of them.

If dialogue and the possibility of judging the veracity or otherwise of religious propositions are kept open, delving into the veracity or otherwise of such judgments will also be possible. Since Imām Khomeinī considers them to be open, based on Islamic epistemology and philosophy, he deals with the problem in a scholarly manner, organizing his arguments on the basis of two cognitive sources – Reason and revelation. Based on rational principles, he firstly denies the necessity for knowledge of the truth and salvation; and secondly, based on Islamic and Shiite juristic rules, considers tolerance's remit to be much broader than salvation's.

In Islamic sciences, the science which deals with the rights and duties of human beings and regulates their social and individual principles is the science of jurisprudence. According to Islamic jurisprudence, Muslims, despite their theological disagreements, are not only obliged to tolerate each other, but also to be kind to and support each another.

Tolerance is not restricted to Muslim nations. Although Muslims have no religious brotherhood with non-Muslims, they are brothers in humanity, and religious disagreement is not an excuse for deception, animosity, and so on.

Muslim nations regulate international relations on the basis of contracts and treaties signed by Islamic governments. They believe that observing international treaties is an obligation – unless they are annulled by others. The Holy Prophet (S) respected his treaties with Jews and unbelievers until they, themselves, breached them.

### **Notes**

1. John Hick, *Mabāḥeth Pluralism Dīnī “Naqd Pluralism Dīnī (Barrasi-ye Didgāh Mutafakkiran Musalmān)”*, Trans. ‘Abd al-Rahīm Govāhī, (Tehran: Tebyan, 1378 S.A.H.), 79.
2. Ibid, 82-83.
3. Ibid, 55-56.
4. Ruḥullāh Khomeinī, *al-Makāsib al-Muḥarramah*, (Tehran: Mu’assase-ye Tanzīm wa Nashr Āthār Imām Khomeinī, 1381 S.A.H.), v. 1, 16-24.
5. Ibid, v. 3, 371.
6. ‘Abd al-Ghanī Ardabilī, *Taqrīrāt Falsafe-ye Imām Khomeinī*, (Tehran: Mu’assase-ye Tanzīm wa Nashr Āthār Imām Khomeinī, 1381 S.A.H.), v. 1, 200-201.