

Henry Corbin and the Resolution of Modern Problems by Recourse to the Concept of the Imaginal Realm

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ABSTRACT: This article intends to approach the problems and concerns of the human being from the perspective of Henry Corbin. Corbin laid the groundwork of his thought by inquiring into the condition of the human being and the problems he is faced with. He found the solution to these problems in philosophical and metaphysical principles. Corbin attributed the problems of modern western thought to the peculiar ontology and epistemology of modern western philosophers, and he sought to resolve these problems by postulating a doctrine of the *mundus imaginalis*.

In the present article, I will investigate a number of the modern problems that Corbin identified as posing a challenge to human thought – such as dualism in ontology and epistemology, secularization of philosophy (the separation of philosophy from theology), obsolescence of eschatology, desanctification of art, a one-sided approach to religion, and a lack of fundamental principles for an ecumenical effort to narrow the gap separating the various religions. Thereafter, I will present Corbin’s solution – which draws on Islamic metaphysics with special emphasis on the Imaginal Realm as an Iranian contribution to Islamic metaphysics, with a view to such Iranian philosophers as Avicenna, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā – followed by a brief criticism.

KEYWORDS: Imaginal Realm (*‘ālam mithāl*), Henry Corbin, modern problems, Islamic metaphysics, Iranian philosophers.

Introduction

Henry Corbin (1903-1978) was arguably the most prominent western commentator of the spiritual wisdom and Islamic philosophy that developed within the matrix of Iranian intellectual thought. His first encounter with Islamic philosophy was by reading a translation of Avicenna's *Physics* (*Ṭabī'īyyāt*) in the course of a class he had with the French neo-Thomist philosopher Etienne Henry Gilson in the years 1923-1924.¹ Avicenna's doctrine concerning the Hierarchy of Emanation and the connection between the cosmos and the Angelic Order fascinated Corbin so much so that angelology and the connection between the Angelic Order and the human and material worlds remained his lifelong interest.² Corbin also made the acquaintance of Louis Massignon, who – despite their disagreements on their research methods, the types of judgments they drew from their studies, and on a number of other points – impressed upon the former his spiritual approach to Persio-Islamic philosophy and the mystical and intellectual heritage of the Shiite faith as it had developed within Iran. Corbin also benefited from German intellectuals such as Hamann, Luther, a number of Protestant theologians, and most importantly, Heidegger. From these German intellectuals, Corbin absorbed their new approach to the interpretation of the Bible, their hermeneutics, and also phenomenology, all of which he would later bring to bear on his study and interpretation of Persio-Islamic philosophy. Reading the Cambridge Platonists, he came across a concept which he later termed, in conformity with Persio-Islamic philosophy, *mundus imaginalis* (the Imaginal Realm). *Mundus imaginalis* took a central role in Corbin's spiritual and philosophic reflections and studies.

His study of Illuminationist philosophy (*ḥikmah al-ishrāq*) during the six years he spent in Istanbul (1939-1945) affectively transformed him into a western Illuminationist philosopher. Henceforth, his thought and work centered on Persio-Islamic spiritual wisdom, as is witnessed by the titles of the works he wrote in this period. For Corbin, the most important and central element of this wisdom was the *mundus imaginalis* – the topic of this article.

Corbin's Concerns

Indeed Corbin turned to philosophy and, particularly, Persio-Islamic philosophy in order to find a solution to the problems that the human being encountered in the modern age. Corbin did not engage himself with philosophy as a detached and abstract intellectual activity from on high and in an illusory ivory tower. On the contrary, he started his philosophical studies and intellectual activities with an inquiry into the condition of the modern human being and the problems he encountered. Having understood the depth and profundity of the problems posed by modernity, he turned to philosophy in pursuit of solutions to these problems.

A list of the most important problems of the modern human being, especially in the West, from Corbin's perspective is as follows: dualism; the secularization of philosophy, that is, the separation of philosophy from theology, the vulgarization of theology, the degradation of philosophy by equating it with sociology and depriving it of the true wisdom that once nurtured its substance; the absence of ontological principles on which religion must rely; the conflict among religions, which is due to the deficiency of the conventional hermeneutical measures employed; the vulgarization of religion, especially Christianity; the historicism of the human being and knowledge; empiricism; desanctification of art; that eschatology, perpetual spiritual rebirth, and the idea of the ideal state have fallen out of fashion; that true human individuality has perished, being replaced by a negative nihilism.³

Corbin came to realize early on that the main reason for the West's crisis was neglecting the *mundus imaginalis* and that its salvation depended on accepting this realm. Corbin's initial understanding of the *mundus imaginalis* was vague and general. His acquaintance with the works and thought of the Cambridge Platonists and later the mythologically inclined thought of Ernst Cassirer as well as the views of Carl Jung – which included allusions to “subtle bodies” – introduced him to certain aspects of the idea that he later termed *mundus imaginalis*, although what these intellectuals had elaborated was drastically

different, a fact Corbin acknowledged. In addition to these intellectuals, Hamann's thought – and especially his hermeneutics in interpreting the Bible and the words of the angels – was yet another influence in his quest for the *mundus imaginalis*.

In his endeavor to find solutions to the crises the West faced, he turned to the spiritual and metaphysical heritage he encountered. Employing the appropriate methodology, he converted this heritage into a form suitable for the modern human being, opening before him new horizons. Corbin sought – to the extent that his resources allowed him (and he enjoyed quite an abundance of resources) – every source that he thought could offer genuine spirituality and wisdom. Among the sources he examined were the ancient spiritual heritage of the West, oriental wisdom such as Hinduism, the spiritual elements of Judaism and Christianity, and finally the modern intellectual trends that shared a common understanding with Corbin as regards the crises that threatened the western civilization, and hence, searched for solutions to meet these crises – such modern intellectual trends as Neo-Thomism, traditionalism, and certain Protestant trends.

Corbin, however, did not find the satisfactory solution in these intellectual, spiritual, or metaphysical systems. It was only after being introduced to prophetic philosophy – embodied most fully in Persio-Islamic wisdom – that he felt he had found what he had been searching for. He realized that it was only through a revival of this Persio-Islamic wisdom that the problems of modern humankind could be satisfactorily resolved. Therefore, it is correct to say that the solution to the problems posed by modernity is to be found in the concept of the *mundus imaginalis*, which occupies a special place in Persio-Islamic metaphysics. According to Corbin, the concept of the Imaginal Realm is so important that it determines the philosophical approach one is to adopt. Due to the great importance he attached to the *mundus imaginalis*, Corbin deals with it in almost all of his works, employing every linguistic and etymological resource available to him in conveying the various allusions and references to this realm found in Persio-Islamic wisdom – such as *'ālam kh̄bāl*,

‘ālam malakūt, ‘arḍ malakūt, iqlīm hashtum (as opposed to the *haft iqlīm*), and the hidden cities of *Jābalqā, Jābarsā, Hūrḡalyā, and Nākujā-ābād*.

Moreover, in order to facilitate a constructive dialogue between the spiritual traditions of the West and the East, he tried to invent a suitable Latin term for rendering the concept of the Imaginal Realm that would as far as possible prevent any misunderstanding – a task that was not all that easy. The difficulty in finding a suitable Latin term was in large part due to the fact that (as well be elaborated later) the Imaginal Realm is not just an existential level of the human being – an existential level that is the locus of an interior insight that grasps a certain aspect of reality and as such is possessed of true epistemic significance – but is also a real realm of the world of existence that lies in between the Realm of the Pure Intellects (*‘ālam ‘uqūl*) and that of matter (*‘ālam māddī*), and hence is a necessary part of existence.⁴ Thus, the Latin rendition should be such as not to entail misunderstanding in the context of western culture, especially since western philosophy after Kant had lost any sense of such a realm, and therefore, lacked an established equivalent for it. The prevalent conception that *imagination* evokes in the context of the western philosophy is an “imaginary” and illusory world, a utopia devoid of any reality other than its presence in the human imagination and mind. Worse still, certain contemporary psychological schools in the West equate this realm with delusion and madness due to the absence of the appropriate metaphysical system necessary for arriving at a correct understanding of this realm.

Another difficulty that Corbin faced was that the term chosen for this realm should be distinguishable from the Platonic Forms (*mundus archetypus*), for that is not what the Imaginal Realm corresponds to.⁵ After taking all these considerations into account, Corbin finally came up with the term *mundus imaginalis*, which he thought was capable of fairly adequately conveying the ontic and epistemic meaning of this realm.

In the present article, I will first provide a brief account of the history of this

discussion. Then, I will consider the features and properties of the *mundus imaginalis* as posited in Persio-Islamic metaphysics and how Corbin sought to utilize this concept in addressing the problems and challenges encountered by the modern western civilization. A critical examination of Corbin's thought will bring this article to an end.

Mundus Imaginalis in Persio-Islamic Metaphysics

Although the postulation of the threefold hierarchical structure of the universe – the Realm of the Pure Intellects (*'ālam 'uqūl*), the Realm of the Spirit (*'ālam nafs*), and the Realm of Matter – is attributed to the Neo-Platonists (Mullā Ṣadrā often cites the *Enneads* of Plotinus in this relation); nevertheless, Corbin emphasises the Persian origin of the *mundus imaginalis*.⁶ This realm, to which Islamic philosophers refer as the *'ālam malakūt*, is a necessary level of the universe whose existential level lies between the *'ālam jabarūt* (or the Realm of Pure Intellects) and the *'ālam mulk* (or the Realm of Matter).⁷ The *mundus imaginalis* is thus the center of the universe and the Eighth Realm (*iqḷīm hasbtum*)⁸ of the realms of existence (*aqālīm wujūd*).⁹

There are no material and sensible objects in the *mundus imaginalis*. This realm, on the one hand, subsumes the eternal specific forms of *sui generis* objects (*ṣuwar narw'ī azalī ashbyā' munfarid*), which in the locus of this realm subsist in a predetermined nexus with the sensible world.¹⁰ And on the other hand, it serves as the intermediate station in which souls reside after departing from the Realm of Matter. In the latter capacity, it is the realm in which the objectified forms of our thoughts, inclinations, and actions subsist. The *mundus imaginalis* incorporates all of these manifestations.¹¹ Furthermore, from the epistemological standpoint, this realm transcends the reach of sense and the empirical apparatus, and as such its properties can be grasped only by means of the imagination or the “interior senses” (*ḥarwās baṭīnī*).¹² It should be noted that this imaginative cognition is not illusory or delusional; it is rather a mode of knowledge that removes the veil from the hidden face of reality, disclosing its esoteric truth. The methodology of this mode of knowledge is spiritual hermeneutics.¹³

In order to clarify the *mundus imaginalis* as portrayed in Persio-Islamic metaphysics, Corbin cites numerous examples and instances, only a few of which, in the interest of brevity, we shall consider here.

1. *Mundus Imaginalis in Ancient Persian Wisdom*

Convinced of the continuity of Persian wisdom before and after Islām, Corbin believed that the origin of the Persio-Islamic concept of the *mundus imaginalis* is to be traced back to ancient Persian wisdom.¹⁴ The *mundus imaginalis* does not belong to this earth, which is the locus of sensible objects; it is rather of the luminous realm beyond.¹⁵ It is located in the East, not in the geographical East, but in a mysterious celestial Orient, which was later referred to as the Realm of *Hūrqalyā*.¹⁶ The Avestan term *airyanem vaejah*, which appears to be the name of the eastern land of the Persians, is actually a reference to this spiritual realm, and it is for this reason that the name is not to be found in ancient maps.¹⁷

In order to locate this mysterious land of the Persians, Corbin states that we must examine the events that take place within its expanse. This is the land wherein Ūrmazd performs his spiritual rites; where the Celestial Heroes come together; wherein the Zīwandigān take refuge, having survived the ferocious winter caused by the evil forces of Ahrīman, preparing to return once again to the world to reinvigorate human life. In addition to its actualized light, in this eastern region there exist manifold potential lights, which have yet to shine. Time is not the same in this land: For the residents, one year passes by as though it were only a day. Even the earth is celestial in this eastern territory. In this territory are located the mysterious cities of *Jābalqā* and *Jābalsā*. Airyanem Vaejah is home to the Seven Holy Immortals of Ūrmazd and the Archangels. This is where God's prophet, at the behest of the archangel Vihūmanah,¹⁸ discards of his body, taking instead a fine luminous body capable of comprehending the events of this world.¹⁹ There is no trace of material and sensible bodies in this country.²⁰ *Hūrqalyū* and Middle Orient are names later applied to this spiritual realm, its gate being designated by Suhrawardī as the Orient of Orientes (*sharq al-ashrāq*), the source of Khūrnah.²¹

This realm is where the sages and saints meet the angels, where the material realm and the higher realms converge, where immortality is manifested.²² For, this realm is where the angels are located. It is in fact identical with the existence of the angels. This realm serves as the intermediary between the world of man and the higher realms. The condition for gaining entry into this realm is to transcend one's corporeal body and physical senses, as they impede man's advancement. It is precisely for this reason that empirical sciences are irrelevant with regard to this spiritual geography and are incapable of fathoming the mysteries of this celestial Earth.²³

2. *Mundus Imaginalis in Avicenna's Metaphysics*

Corbin considers Avicennan thought as the turning point in the history of Islamic philosophy as regards the concept of the *mundus imaginalis*. For Corbin, Avicenna's "Oriental Philosophy" – which he equates with the Greek idea of *theosophia*²⁴ – represents a philosophical worldview in whose context the three successive realms of existence – intellectual, imaginal, and material – are simultaneously present. Corbin's *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital* deals largely with this topic. That Corbin paid such careful attention to Avicenna's *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān* – a tale that employs the language of the Imaginal Realm, that of allegory – and connected it closely with Suhrawardī's *Qisṣah al-Ghurbah al-Gharbiyyah* demonstrates his perpetual preoccupation with this topic, a preoccupation that was with him to the end.

To understand the Imaginal Realm as postulated by Avicenna, it is necessary to grasp his view concerning the Order of Emanation. Avicenna holds that the Order of Emanation (the Order of Divine Effusion) is a hierarchy consisting of three levels: the Intellectual Realm, the Imaginal Realm, and the Material Realm. The first being to emanate from God is the First Intellect. From the latter, three subsequent beings proceed: the Second Intellect, the matter of the Highest Celestial Sphere, and the spirit of the Highest Celestial Sphere. The Second Intellect produces the Third Intellect, and this act of emanation continues until the Tenth Intellect, the Active Intellect, which

begets the infinite array of multiplicity. (These ten intellects, it should be noted, are distinct from the human intellect – a point Corbin found very interesting.) The spirit of the celestial spheres and the Active Intellect – the agent that creates human spirits and inspires them – form the sacred juncture at which human intellect and divine revelation meet.

Such is the order of the Intellectual Realm as depicted by Avicenna – a hierarchy that begins with the First Intellect and ends with the Active Intellect. The nine spirits of the celestial spheres, which are also the angels of the Imaginal Realm, proceed in parallel order, each spirit acting as the agent that sets the matter of its celestial sphere in motion. Although the spirits of the celestial spheres lack sensory faculties as a result of being immaterial beings, yet through their infinite power, they are able to create the heavens and cause the perpetual motion of the celestial spheres. Their infinite power derives from the supernal intellects (*'uqūl karrūbī*), which also produce the angels of the Imaginal Realm. What compels the intellects to proffer such infinite power is the boundless love that the spirits of the celestial sphere have for the intellects. It is for this reason that the various heavens produced by these spirits in the cosmos are possessed of, in addition to their material existence, an angelic luminosity and aura, receiving their true identity from them.

Although Avicenna endorsed contemporary astronomy, he disagreed with the astronomers in that he attributed the motion of the celestial spheres to angels and the spirits of those spheres. In his view, the astronomers had simply produced an “occidental” astronomy whereas he sought an “oriental” astronomy corresponding to “oriental wisdom”.²⁵ Avicenna maintained that the spirits of the celestial spheres belonged to the spiritual heavens, which were by nature impervious to the tools of astronomy.²⁶ In other words, in Avicenna’s cosmology, the universe is divided into two main parts: the Orient and the Occident. Of course, what is intended here is not to be identified with geographical location. The Imaginal Realm is the Middle Orient, lying in between the Near Orient (the human soul) and the Far Orient (the supernal intellects). The Occident, on the other hand, represents the material and

sensible world, which contains two realms: On the one hand, there is the sublunary realm of the material earth, which is subject to change and corruption, and on the other, there is the realm of the celestial spheres, which is composed of ether, and thus, incorruptible. The lowest point of the Orient is the Realm of the Spirit (*iqḷīm nafs*), above which are the angels of the celestial spheres, and the ultimate level belongs to the Pure Intellects.²⁷

In Avicenna's angelology, the soul, in order to progress in its gradual ascent toward the Intellectual Realm, dons a subtle ethereal body – a body on which the spirits of the celestial spheres bestow various forms, shapes, and visions.²⁸

3. *Mundus Imaginalis as Depicted by Suhrawardī*

Shaykh Shahāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī, whose works on the Imaginal Realm are of great significance, succeeded in generating genuinely innovative ideas as regards the philosophical discipline of cosmology. Postulating the Imaginal Realm from an ontological standpoint, he articulated the ontic and immediate theory of knowledge, thus emphasizing the existence of the Imaginal Realm.²⁹

Corbin viewed Suhrawardī's postulation of the Imaginal Realm as an extension of the wisdom of the sages of ancient Persia, elaborating on their theory of imaginal knowledge. Suhrawardī borrowed the concepts of the Interworld (*barzakḥ*), the spirit, and the resurrection from the wisdom of ancient Persia, recasting them in an Islamic form.³⁰ By reviving the philosophy of Illumination and the angelology of ancient Persia, Suhrawardī succeeded in depicting a general picture of the world based on the Interworld and the imaginal forms.³¹

From Suhrawardī's viewpoint, the Imaginal Realm – which he occasionally refers to with the alternative name of the World of the Suspended Archetypes (*'ālam muthul mu'allaq*) – must not be confused with the Platonic realm of archetypes (*mundus archetypus*). *Nākujā-ābād* ("Country of Nowhere") was a name coined by Suhrawardī to refer to the Imaginal Realm, which closely resembles the western term *utopia*. The place that he describes as being situated

behind Mount Qāf symbolizes for him and the other Illuminationists the same meaning associated with such mysterious cities as *Jābalqā*, *Jābalsā*, *Hūrqalyā*.³²

The Imaginal Realm is also called the Interworld, for being the intermediate world between the Intellectual and the Material Realms. In the matrix of this realm, spirits become embodied and bodies become spiritual.³³ Corporeal resurrection is realized in this realm, and just as man's perishable body is made of the material earth, his resurrection body is made of this celestial Earth.³⁴

According to the world schema Suhrawardī offered, the hierarchy of existence contains four levels:

- The Intellectual Realm, also called the Realm of *Jabarūt*;
- The realm of the spirits of the celestial spheres and human spirits, also referred to as the Realm of *Malakūt*;
- The two interworlds, consisting of the sublunary spheres and elements, which is designated as the Realm of *Mulk*; and
- The Imaginal Realm, which is the gateway of the Realm of *Malakūt*;

comprising within its sphere the mysterious cities of *Jābalqā*, *Jābalsā*, and *Hūrqalyā*.³⁵ Whereas Avicenna identifies *barzakh* in point of eschatology with the intermediary world and in point of cosmology with the Imaginal Realm, Suhrawardī defines it as body, veil, and interval, being in its essence utter darkness.³⁶

Intent on showing the way to illumination and to the celestial realm, he interprets the feats and adventures of such mythic heroes as Hermes and Kaykhusru – fleeing darkness, the sudden rush of a spring of water, walking on water, climbing to the peak of Mount Qāf – as mystical allegories corresponding to and symbolizing the Middle Orient. In other words, he considers them true events that take place not in the Material Realm nor in the Intellectual Realm, but in the Imaginal Realm, which is the locus of all mystical allegories.

The Imaginal Realm or *Malakūt* is neither in the past nor in the future; it is rather an ever-present eternity. Its presence is absolute, meaning that it is unaffected by the conditions and circumstances that man engenders.³⁷

The objection may be raised that Suhrawardī's postulation of the four realms was based on medieval cosmology, which has been proven false, and thus irrelevant to the modern age.³⁸ Corbin answers that the discoveries of modern cosmology and astronomy do not invalidate those of Suhrawardī and the other ancient sages. For, as Suhrawardī himself puts it, the sciences that are subject to change and revision pertain to the terrestrial side of Mount Qāf whereas the cosmology of the theosophers pertains to the mountain and beyond, realms that can be understood only by those who have journeyed there.³⁹ The spirits of celestial spheres constitute the inner spiritual substance of stellar phenomena, and as such empirical science is incapable of comprehending them.⁴⁰ In other words, as far as Illuminationist metaphysics is concerned, it is irrelevant whether the physical world is heliocentric or geocentric, for the phenomena that are described in this metaphysical system occur in the Imaginal Realm, not in the Material Realm. The Imaginal Realm is beyond the reach of sensory perception and empirical devices: It can be comprehended only by virtue of the soul's attachment to it – an attachment that Corbin designates as phenomenology or *kashf al-mahjūb*.⁴¹

4. *Mundus Imaginalis* in Mullā Ṣadrā's Metaphysical System

One of the features of Mullā Ṣadrā's metaphysics is its endorsement of the Imaginal Realm as an indispensable and necessary part of the hierarchy of existence. In this metaphysical system, the concept of the Imaginal Realm is closely related to the principle of the objectivity of existence. Although Ibn 'Arabī preceded Mullā Ṣadrā in articulating the "active imagination" – which ultimately led to Mullā Ṣadrā's exposition of the threefold hierarchy of existence, consisting of the Material, the Imaginal, and the Intellectual Realms – it was the latter who perfected the idea by characterizing the active

imagination as a spiritual cognitive faculty independent of the bodily organs, describing it as the “subtle body” of the soul.⁴² That this faculty is spiritual is evidenced, in Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, by its immateriality.

Mullā Ṣadrā places the Imaginal Realm in the spiritual and celestial world of *Malakūt*. Thus, the world of existence is a threefold hierarchy.⁴³ The creatures that reside in the Imaginal Realm – which intermediates between the Realm of Matter and that of the Supernal Intellects – are spiritual bodies, resurrection bodies, and interworld spirits.⁴⁴

Mullā Ṣadrā holds that the human soul is corporeal at its inception, evolving into a spiritual being only gradually and through substantial motion (*ḥarikat jawharī*). This metamorphosis obtains by virtue of man’s relation with immaterial forms, including the interworld forms of the Imaginal Realm.⁴⁵ The threefold hierarchy of human existence – corporeal, imaginal, and intellectual – requires that man experience life and death at least three times. The first time is on his arrival into the Material Realm. The second time is when he experiences death and leaves the Material Realm, whereat his soul is revived in the Interworld in a subtle and spiritual body. For, this body (which is also referred to as the “acquired body”) is utterly contingent on the soul’s actions and inclinations and as such follows the soul into the Interworld. The name accorded to this stage of life in religious parlance is the Lesser Resurrection (*qīāmat ṣughbrā*). The third stage is the Greater Resurrection (*qīāmat kubrā*), wherein the soul attains to the station of the perfect spiritual man.⁴⁶

The Imaginal Realm is possessed of unique epistemological (cognitive) value.⁴⁷ The faculty that can apprehend this epistemological value is the imagination,⁴⁸ which intervenes between the faculty of sensation and that of intellection, just as the spirit (*nafs*) intermediates between the body and the soul.⁴⁹ This faculty is neither utterly material nor purely intellectual but is rather the middle ground between these two opposites, a position that enables it to convert the interior states of the soul into imaginatively apprehensible phenomena. This creative faculty is in reality the ethereal body of the soul. Its

cognitive activity is independent of the corporeal and material body, and hence its cognitive value is greater than that of sensory perception. And since it is incorporeal, it withstands the death of the body, continuing in existence. The faculty of active imagination is not dispersed among the five senses, and for this reason all of the faculties of the soul converge onto it after death, which means that the soul can avail itself of it after the corporeal body perishes.⁵⁰

5. *Mundus Imaginalis in Western Philosophy*

The majority of western philosophers – such as Descartes, Emerson, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Christian Wolff – allow no place for the *mundus imaginalis* in their philosophies. Corbin attributes western philosophy's rejection of the *mundus imaginalis* to Averroes' dismissal of this concept and the influence that he and his Latin commentators exerted on the development of western philosophy.

Corbin maintains that the decadence of western philosophy started with Averroism, by its dismissal of and contempt for Avicennan cosmology and specifically the hierarchy of the intermediary angels, including the celestial spirits, by its reinstatement of the duality of existence, and by its severance of the connection between the Active Intellect and the Angel of Revelation, the Holy Spirit. It was thus that the spirits were set aside and the epistemic value of the faculty of imagination was negated.⁵¹ The threefold hierarchy postulated by Avicenna was superseded by a twofold world schema consisting of the Material Realm and the Intellectual Realm. In the context of this cosmology, the Imaginal Realm – which was in the Avicennan tradition the nexus that connected the Material Realm with the Intellectual Realm – was ontologically untenable. Correspondingly, the human essence – which in Avicennan anthropology was a hierarchical triad, comprising the body, the soul, and the intellect – was divided into two discrete parts.⁵² As such, the meaning and function of the Active Intellect was altered with epistemological as well as anthropological ramifications. Corbin viewed the dismissal of Avicennan angelology in Averroes' cosmology, which resulted in denying the

validity of imagination and the reality of the Imaginal Realm, as one of the greatest errors in western eastern thought, with implications that have been decisive in the development of western philosophy since the Enlightenment.⁵³

There have, however, been exceptions to this general trend in western philosophy. Such mystics and philosophers as Emanuel Swedenborg, Jacob Boehme, and the Cambridge Platonists accepted the existence of the *mundus imaginalis*.⁵⁴ Of the western theosophers, Swedenborg was the most successful in offering a coherent articulation of this realm. His works and thought bear an astonishing similarity to those of Suhrawardī and Ibn ‘Arabī. Swedenborg posits a spiritual space that is different from the material space of this physical world. As such, beyond the sensible world, there is a world in which heaven, earth, animals, plants, human beings, and every other creature is spiritual.⁵⁵

Jacob Boehme, too, believes that there is a spiritual world in between the sensible and the intellectual worlds. This spiritual world is possessed of a sacred essence and a spiritual corporeality in which capacity it participates in our material world. This refuge, this imaginal and spiritual space is wisdom or *sophia* whose existence is essentially prior to history and the visible and exoteric space.

We can now turn to an investigation of the crises whose solution, in Corbin’s view, could only be sought by accepting the Imaginal Realm

The Role of the Mundus Imaginalis in Resolving the Crises Faced by the Modern Man

Corbin points to belief in the Imaginal Realm as the solution to many a problem. Belief in this realm is a distinctive feature of Persio-Islamic philosophy, and so by applying this belief to modern problems, we can restore this philosophy.⁵⁶ Corbin asserts that the position of western rationalism vis-à-vis the imagination can be corrected only if it is amended by a cosmology similar to that of Illuminationist theosophy.⁵⁷ The only definite solution to the crises of the West, in Corbin’s view, is that western philosophy should accept the objective reality of the *mundus imaginalis*.⁵⁸

At this point, we shall examine Corbin's concerns relating to the challenges that the modern man faces and the solutions that Corbin derived from Islamic philosophy.

1. Dualism

One of the most significant implications of negating the Imaginal Realm is that it leads to a dualistic worldview. Refuting this realm – which is the nexus that links the Material and Intellectual Realms – entails, first, a dualistic ontology and, second, the severance of the unity of reason and revelation, which was so strongly emphasized in Avicennan philosophy, for the Imaginal Realm is the realm of angels. This dualistic worldview has caused numerous problems for the western world. Secularism – that is, the separation of philosophy from theology, reason, and revelation – is a product of this dualistic worldview.

Rejecting the Imaginal Realm opened the way for ideas such as those offered by Descartes. Descartes holds that the human being is composed of two distinct and opposite substances – body and soul, the former of which is characterized by extension and the latter by its ability to think. Cartesian duality, in turn, resulted in numerous problems, for whose solution western philosophers resorted to an illusory and unreal world of imagination. They sought the solution to these problems relating to the human being in this world of illusion, neglecting that the needs and problems of the human soul can be found solely in an objective imaginal world.

This dualistic conception of soul and body resulted in a rupture between the two entities, leading some to accept the body at the expense of the soul and some to accept the soul at the expense of the body. But even Spiritualism was unable to appreciate the full range of spiritual matters and to understand the entire body of religious truths. For, there are spiritual truths that could be accounted for only by recourse to the Imaginal Realm.

But as mentioned above, this dualism was not restricted to the soul-body

relation: It encompassed the entire world of existence, and consequently, extended to the sphere of knowledge. On the one hand, existence was bifurcated into the intellectual and the sensible, and on the other hand, the rejection of the intermediate realm of existence drove a wedge between reason and revelation, the two sources of genuine knowledge. It means that the irreconcilable opposition between reason and revelation or science and religion.

The Church, which endorsed this dualism, found the solution in giving exclusive authority to revelation, repudiating the legitimacy of science and reason. This position was in stark contrast to the Avicennan solution, which identified the Active Intellect with the Angel of Revelation as the ultimate source of rational and revelatory knowledge and which maintained that every individual, without having to seek the intercession of a particular intermediary (such as the Church), could connect with the Active Intellect, and thus, achieve genuine knowledge.

Corbin found the only solution to this dualistic dilemma in Persio-Islamic wisdom. He concluded that it was only by accepting the Imaginal Realm that the soul-body, thought-extension, intelligible-sensible dualities could be overcome, thus freeing western philosophy of the impasse in which it was trapped.⁵⁹

2. Secularization (The Separation of Theology and Philosophy)

Another consequence of rejecting the Imaginal Realm is that it results in the separation of philosophy from theology. This is because the Imaginal Realm is where the prophet and the philosopher meet; it is where the Intellectual Realm and the Sensible Realm converge. As Corbin was of the opinion that religious beliefs could not be supported by rational arguments, he maintained that rejecting the Imaginal Realm would force the faithful to either opt for a stagnant superficiality or to take refuge in mythology. Both of these courses would mean that religious beliefs were devoid of real content, for prophetic revelations and visions, which are the epistemological foundation of religious beliefs, have their source in the Imaginal Realm. As a result, “rational truth” and

“revelatory truth,” philosophy and theology came into conflict.⁶⁰ However, accepting the Imaginal Realm and the corresponding cognitive faculty vindicates prophetic revelations and mystical visions. This explains the importance of imagination as the cognitive faculty that apprehends imaginal reality.⁶¹

The Prophet’s Celestial Ascent (*mi‘rāj*) is the perfect exemplar of the ascent of man’s pure soul, an ascent that theologians and mystics are inspired to make. By connecting with the Active Intellect – that is, Gabriel – one can acquire pure immediate knowledge. The mediation of the Active Intellect as the angel of gnosis or the bestower of mental images implies a sort of individual revelation and gnosis as the result of which the eternal forms or imaginal manifestations of beings are revealed to one, should one’s soul be ready for such a revelation.⁶² Based on this understanding, the Imaginal Realm is the world in which the conflict between philosophy and theology, faith and science, mystery and history is resolved.

3. *The Elimination of Eschatology*

Another implication of rejecting the Imaginal Realm is the negation of individuality in the human being, and the meaning of resurrection is nothing but the continual rebirth of the soul. Only if we accept the Imaginal Realm, we can legitimately hold to the spiritual and immaterial ascent of the soul to realms greater and more spiritual than the Material Realm, which is achievable by severing the material attachments. Leaving the restrictions and confinements of the Material Realm, the soul arrives at a more luminous realm, whereat man’s Lesser Resurrection (*qīāmat ṣuḡhrā*) is realized, and it is thus that life after death finds meaning. The higher one’s level of ascent is, the more one undergoes rebirth. It is through these successive rebirths that one’s individuation, which is eternally determined, is revealed. In other words, by virtue of his rebirths, man returns to his original self, whence he came. That origin is closely and intimately connected to the angel that brought him out of potentiality and into actuality that brought him into this world and made him immortal. Without the Imaginal Realm, spiritual individuality, eternity,

immortality, successive rebirth, and resurrection are all meaningless. In addition, Corbin believes, denying the Imaginal Realm and the “subtle body” (*jism latīf*) renders corporeal resurrection (*ma‘ād jismānī*) an insoluble dilemma. By articulating the *mundus imaginalis*, Mullā Ṣadrā and certain members of the Shaykhīyyah succeeded in offering a legitimate solution to the problem of corporeal resurrection and a cogent exposition of the resurrection body.

4. *Desanctification of Art*

Yet, another dilemma with which western culture grapples is the desanctification of art. As opposed to Islamic tradition, in the West imagination and art – which is itself a product of imagination – have been detached from the world of spiritual meaning and sanctity and have instead been founded on other principles. By rejecting the Imaginal Realm, art is deprived of the mysterious yet objective functions of this realm, undermining the very substance of mystical metaphor. Hence, imaginative forms of illuminative recitals become unattainable. In its attempt to fill this void, modern psychology turns to a delusional and utopian world of imagination that is cut off from the objective world and is detached from the higher realms. In Islamic philosophy, however, art is sacred, for it is connected to the spiritual realm.

5. *A One-Dimensional Approach to Religion and the Lack of Genuine Ecumenical Principles*

As the Imaginal Realm opens the eyes of the faithful to a vaster and more spiritual realm than the Material Realm, endowing them with a more comprehensive and profound insight, their understanding of and approach to religion is elevated. Thus, they no longer cling to a one-dimensional and superficial interpretation of religion, for they see it as a manifestation of transcendent truths. This more elevated understanding can serve as the basis for bringing the different religions – in spite of the differences – closer together.

Criticism

That Corbin relied on profound metaphysical and spiritual principles for resolving the problems of modernity and that he invoked the Imaginal Realm as an invaluable treasure-trove of Persio-Islamic philosophy capable of resolving many of the problems of modernity are valuable and pioneering accomplishments that he succeeded in achieving, and as such he holds a special place in the history of Islamic philosophy. Though Corbin deserves our praise and respect for what he accomplished, nevertheless several critical observations are in order so as to complement the great task that he took upon himself to achieve. They are as follows:

In his endeavor to resolve the crises of the West, Corbin confines himself to ontological and epistemological aspects, neglecting the non-epistemic factors. The validity or invalidity of an epistemological standpoint and its effect in bringing about or resolving a problem constitute only part of the difficulty. There are many other factors – such as economic circumstances, political power, control of the media – that influence the individual's and the society's epistemological orientation. The influence that these factors exert is no less significant, if not stronger, than the content of an epistemological position, and since the latter is a very critical element in directing Corbin's thought, it seems necessary that it should be considered anew in light of these non-epistemic factors.

Although justified in studying the metaphysical systems of Avicenna, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā in view of the Imaginal Realm, Corbin goes further, reducing Islām to its spiritual and imaginal components, utterly neglecting the other aspects and elements of this holistic faith. It is unacceptable that Islām and Shiism should be identified solely with the Imaginal Realm and the non-spatial and non-temporal world, dismissing the aspects related to the temporal and the spatial and the social elements of Islām – which are strongly emphasized in the Qur'ān and the corpus of Islamic tradition and are entrenched by the tradition of the early religious authorities

and scholars, who vigorously and consistently practiced these temporal aspects of Islām from the very beginning of the faith until the advent of the Greater Occultation – as mundane and superficial. Furthermore, that Corbin – reflecting on Christianity’s sad history as regards the doctrine of divine incarnation in Jesus and thereafter in the Church – equates Islām’s growing popularity with its demise is an assumption that is contrary to religious and historical evidence.

Another fundamental problem with Corbin’s prodigious studies is that he ignores the rational and discursive aspects of the topics he considers. Islamic theosophy – regardless of whether it is represented in the metaphysical system of Avicenna, Suhrawardī, or Mullā Ṣadrā – partakes, in addition to its spiritual and intuitive aspect, of a rational aspect, and so to underestimate this aspect is tantamount to misconstruing its essential substance. For instance, Corbin is uninterested in determining the rational criteria according to which the Avicennan emanation schema and elucidation of the Imaginal Realm is superior to Averroes’ purely Aristotelian metaphysics and cosmology: His only concern is the Imaginal Realm’s role in the hierarchy of existence and in resolving the problems of western philosophy. This is a serious drawback, for it leads to the conclusion that the metaphysical systems that lack sufficient rational justification (such as the Shaykhīyah) are put on a par with those that enjoy a firm rational foundation – namely, the metaphysics of Avicenna, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā – only because they all share a belief in the Imaginal Realm. This is unacceptable. To put it differently, Corbin’s criterion in accepting a metaphysical system is incapable of evaluating and judging between various metaphysical systems.

A similar problem concerns Corbin’s lax treatment of historical evidence. In studying historical events and phenomena, Corbin tends to treat historical evidence – though there may be multiple documents and sources – with a degree of indifference. For Corbin, it is his non-historical presuppositions, which he invokes in his analysis, that are important. It should go without

saying that this approach cannot succeed. One cannot simply dismiss tens or even hundreds of historical documents that refute a hypothesis, just so as to cling tenaciously to one's presuppositions.

The last point pertains to Corbin's hermeneutical approach. In addition to its being one-sided – overemphasizing the spiritual at the expense of the other aspects involved – it suffers from yet another defect: Corbin's unwarranted extrapolation. That is, citing only a few indications, he confidently draws conclusions that are scarcely substantiated by the cited indications. That an ancient Persian text, for instance, mentions regions that are not to be found on any map should not be *a priori* construed as signifying the Imaginal Realm, contenting oneself with abstract reasoning to explain the connection while neglecting to adequately examine the historical context of the text, to compare and contrast it with other ancient texts, and to take into consideration the abundant historical studies conducted by other scholars. Were it correct to employ such unrestrained hermeneutics, one could justify any idea regardless of how unfounded the grounds may be – a consequence Corbin would definitely not accept. And the reason that we prefer Corbin over the likes of Mircea Eliade is precisely this: Corbin presupposes the necessity of a justifiable hermeneutical framework and the insufficiency of relying on intuitive and phenomenological conjectures and unwarranted accounts.

Notes

1. Gilson is best known for reviving Medieval philosophy in the modern age. As opposed to Emile Brehier, Gilson maintained the genuineness of Christian philosophy. Corbin was greatly influenced by Gilson especially in his methodology of approaching religious philosophies and in believing that the Bible can serve as the grounds for developing and advancing Christian thought and scholarship. It was this influence that in large part shaped Corbin's approach in understanding, interpreting, and reviving Persio-Islamic philosophy.
2. His acquaintance with Avicenna's philosophy and that of Suhrawardī compelled him to learn Farsi and Arabic.

3. Henry Corbin, *Az Heidegger tā Subrawardī*, trans. Ḥāmid Fūlādward, (Tehran: Sāzmān Chāp wa Intishārāt Farhang wa Irshād Islāmī, 1383 S.A.H.), 46-47.
4. Henry Corbin, *Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*, trans. Jawād Ṭabāṭabā'ī, (Tehran: Intishārāt Tūs, 1369 S.A.H.), 119.
5. Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, ed., *Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*, (Tehran: Ḥaqīqat, 1384 S.A.H.), 249.
6. Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 101-102.
7. Ibid, 122-123; Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 259.
8. The northern hemisphere of the earth, which was considered its habitable part in classical geography, was divided into seven realms or regions. Thus, the *Eighth Realm* signifies the otherworldliness of this Imaginal Realm.
9. Henry Corbin, *Arḍ Malakūt wa Kālbud Insān dar Rūz Rastākhibz: Az Īrān Mazdā'ī tā Īrān Shī'ī*, trans. Dīā' al-Dīn Dihshīrī, (Tehran: Markaz Īrānī Muṭalī'ah Farhanghā, 1358 S.A.H.), 17-18, 27, and 101; (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 118; Henry Corbin, *Bunmāyih-hā-ye Āyīn Zartushtī dar Andīshih Subrawardī*, trans. Maḥmūd Bihfurūzī, (Tehran: Jāmī, 1384 S.A.H.), 113.
10. This is, of course, based on the assumption that Shaykh Ishrāq subscribed to “essentialism” or *aṣālat mābīyyat* (the objectivity of essence as opposed to existence).
11. Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 257-258.
12. Henry Corbin, (*Arḍ Malakūt wa Kālbud Insān dar Rūz Rastākhibz: Az Īrān Mazdā'ī tā Īrān Shī'ī*), 16-18 and 27; (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 118; Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 259 and 267-272.
13. Henry Corbin, (*Arḍ Malakūt wa Kālbud Insān dar Rūz Rastākhibz: Az Īrān Mazdā'ī tā Īrān Shī'ī*), 57.
14. Corbin wrote three books on the characteristics of the *mundus imaginalis* as articulated in the context of this wisdom. These are *Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shi'ite Iran*, *The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism*, and *Zoroastrian Origins of Subrawardī's Thought*.
15. Henry Corbin, *Insān Nūrānī dar Taṣawwuf Īrānī*, trans. Farāmarz Jawāhirīnā, (Tehran: Intishārāt Gulbān, 1383 S.A.H.), 29.
16. Ibid, 45.
17. Ibid, 65.

18. Suhrawardī identifies the First Intellect with this angel (which in the Mazdean faith is the First Ashmāspand), to which he refers by its Zoroastrian designation, Bahman.
19. Henry Corbin, (*Insān Nūrānī dar Taṣawwuf Īrānī*), 67-69.
20. Henry Corbin, (*Bunmāyib-hā-ye Āyīn Zartushtī dar Andīshih Subrawardī*), 113.
21. *Khūrnab* or *Khurab*: In ancient Persian mythology and religion, Divine Light, which emanates from God.
22. Henry Corbin, (*Bunmāyib-hā-ye Āyīn Zartushtī dar Andīshih Subrawardī*), 119.
23. Henry Corbin, (*Arḍ Malakūt wa Kālbud Insān dar Rūz Rastākhīz: Az Īrān Mazdā'ī tā Īrān Shī'ī*), 48-49, 71, 150-152, and 621; (*Insān Nūrānī dar Taṣawwuf Īrānī*), 70-72.
24. Henry Corbin, (*Bunmāyib-hā-ye Āyīn Zartushtī dar Andīshih Subrawardī*), 63.
25. Henry Corbin, *Ibn Sīnā wa Tamthīl 'Irfānī*, trans. Inshā'allāh Raḥmatī, (Tehran: Jāmī, 1387 S.A.H.), 306-307.
26. Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 122-124.
27. Henry Corbin, (*Arḍ Malakūt wa Kālbud Insān dar Rūz Rastākhīz: Az Īrān Mazdā'ī tā Īrān Shī'ī*), 152-154.
28. Henry Corbin, (*Ibn Sīnā wa Tamthīl 'Irfānī*), 188-189 and 433.
29. Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 93; *Tārīkh Falsafih Islāmī*, trans. Jawād Ṭabāṭabā'ī, (Tehran: Intishārāt Kawīr, 1380 S.A.H.), 300.
30. Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 101-102.
31. Henry Corbin, (*Arḍ Malakūt wa Kālbud Insān dar Rūz Rastākhīz: Az Īrān Mazdā'ī tā Īrān Shī'ī*), 58.
32. Corbin explains in one of his articles that the term *Nākujā-ābād* is similar to *utopia* in another way as well: The latter is not contained in any of the classical Greek dictionaries. The English statesman and author, Thomas More (1478-1535), was responsible for coining the term *utopia*, which he employed as an abstract concept signifying the absence of a determinate spatial location perceivable to our senses (Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 252-255).
33. Henry Corbin, (*Ibn Sīnā wa Tamthīl 'Irfānī*) 304.
34. Henry Corbin, (*Bunmāyib-hā-ye Āyīn Zartushtī dar Andīshih Subrawardī*), 95; (*Arḍ Malakūt wa Kālbud Insān dar Rūz Rastākhīz: Az Īrān Mazdā'ī tā Īrān Shī'ī*), 58; (*Ibn Sīnā wa Tamthīl 'Irfānī*), 304.
35. Henry Corbin, (*Tārīkh Falsafih Islāmī*), 299-300.

36. Ibid, 298; and to read more on Suhrawardī's angelology, see Henry Corbin, (*Bunmāyib-hā-ye Āyīn Zartushtī dar Andīshih Subrawardī*), 33-35.
37. Ibid, 95; (*Arḍ Malakūt wa Kālbud Insān dar Rūz Rastākhibz: Az Īrān Mazdā'ī tā Īrān Shī'ī*), 58; Henry Corbin, (*Ibn Sīnā wa Tamthīl 'Irfānī*), 304.
38. Ibid, 451.
39. Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 256.
40. Corbin affirms that *ta'wīl* or spiritual hermeneutics is impossible without believing in the Imaginal Realm. The principal function of Persian philosophy, according to Corbin, is to direct philosophy anew to the Imaginal Realm and its function and significance. See Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 124-128.
41. Henry Corbin, (*Bunmāyib-hā-ye Āyīn Zartushtī dar Andīshih Subrawardī*), 64; (*Ibn Sīnā wa Tamthīl 'Irfānī*), 304.
42. Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 101-102 and 118.
43. Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 199-200 and 263-266; Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 82.
44. Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 82, 199-200 and 263-266.
45. Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 101.
46. Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 84.
47. Ibid, 82, 199-200, and 263-266.
48. Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 118.
49. Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 82.
50. Henry Corbin, (*Tārīkh Falsafih Islāmī*), 301;
Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 362-365.
51. Ibid, 266;
Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 118, 124-128.
52. Henry Corbin, (*Az Heidegger tā Subrawardī*), 94; (*Arḍ Malakūt wa Kālbud Insān dar Rūz Rastākhibz: Az Īrān Mazdā'ī tā Īrān Shī'ī*), 26; (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 121-122 and 126-128.
53. Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'ī, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 82-83; Henry Corbin, (*Insān Nūrānī dar Taṣawwuf Īrānī*), 51-53; (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 93.

54. Henry Corbin, (*Arḍ Malakūt wa Kālbud Insān dar Rūz Rastākhibz: Az Īrān Mazdā'i tā Īrān Shi'i*), 26-27; (*Az Heidegger tā Suhrawardī*), 94-95.
55. Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'i, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 262.
56. Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 119-120.
57. Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'i, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 269.
58. Ibid, 270-272.
59. Henry Corbin, (*Ibn Sīnā wa Tamthīl 'Irfānī*), 449; (*Tārīkh Falsafih Islāmī*), 85-86; Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjū'i, (*Majmū'ih Maqālāt Henry Corbin*), 82.
60. Henry Corbin, (*Falsafih-hā-yi Īrānī wa Falsafih-ye Taṭbīqī*), 124-125.
61. Henry Corbin, (*Tārīkh Falsafih Islāmī*), 85-86.
62. Henry Corbin, (*Ibn Sīnā wa Tamthīl 'Irfānī*), 118-119, 189, 433, and 454-455.